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1 Introduction
The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis can be traced to the work of Micha l Kalecki
and Josef Steindl via Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984), and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990).
The theoretical framework supposes that total consumption is an increasing function of the
labour share, and total investment and net exports are non-increasing functions of the labour
share. Depending on the relative strength of these distributive effects, an increase in the
labour share will either increase or decrease aggregate demand, and thereby gross domestic
product (GDP). The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis states that the distributive
effect on demand works in favour of wages: an increase in the labour share will lead to an
increase in GDP.
The interplay between the distribution of income and the level of aggregate demand
has been argued, by a number of prominent economists, to be of central importance in
rethinking macroeconomic theory in light of the 2008 crisis (e.g. Stiglitz 2011). The wage led
aggregate demand hypothesis itself has been influential in those policy-focused international
institutions broadly aligned with developing countries and the labour movement (UNCTAD
2010, Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012). However, a variety of estimation procedures and data
types have been used to test the hypothesis, and different studies often come to different
conclusions. This is particularly the case in the UK. Studies relying on equation-by-equation
estimation procedures, for example, tend to find support for wage led aggregate demand in
the UK. This is the case in Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and Storm (2007), Hein and
Vogel (2008), Onaran and Galanis (2014), and Obst and Onaran (2015). The single study
using a systems estimation procedure, Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), finds no support
for the hypothesis.
The purpose of the present paper is to attempt to resolve this incongruity by testing
the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis for the UK using VAR models. Given this,
our approach is based on identified shocks to real earnings, rather than the labour share
or total labour income. Modelling the labour share directly almost forces the researcher
to use identification restrictions based on the Bhaduri-Marglin model, or some adaptation
of it, which is the approach taken in the bulk of the existing literature. Focusing on real
earnings allows us to take a liberal approach to identification, so we do not have to specify a
particular structural model with a large number of degrees of freedom. Essentially, instead
of identifying shocks to the labour share directly, we estimate movements in the labour share
indirectly, by estimating the responses of GDP and total employment to identified shocks
to real earnings.
Our focus in this paper is solely on short run changes in the functional income distribu-
tion, and we do not estimate long run relationships. This is, perhaps, the simplest approach
to the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, although it runs counter to arguments made
in Blecker (2014). While we are not averse to the proposition that income distribution effects
operate at low frequencies, it seems likely that the best way to approach this problem em-
pirically would be via cross-country growth regressions, or using long time series at annual
frequencies. The foregoing, in addition, explains why we refer to the wage led aggregate
demand hypothesis throughout the paper, rather than the wage led growth hypothesis as in
Bhaduri (2008).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the wage led aggregate
demand hypothesis in the context of movements in real earnings, rather than the labour
share, and compares this to the existing literature. With this background, section 3 discusses
our empirical approach and identification strategy. Section 4 discusses our data sources and
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variable definitions, and section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes, and
discusses the implications of our results for theory and policy.
2 The Wage Led Aggregate Demand Hypothesis
Consider a general model of the business cycle, where the endogenous variables are consump-
tion (C), investment (I), net exports (X), and GDP (Y ). Assume that GDP is determined
by the aggregate demand identity, and the components of aggregate demand are functions
of GDP and the labour share (h), such that,
Y = C + I +X, (1)
C = C(Y, h), (2)
I = I(Y, h), (3)
X = X(Y, h), (4)
suppressing exogenous government spending. The total differentials are given by,
dY = dC + dI + dX, (5)
dC =
∂C
∂Y
dY +
∂C
∂h
dh, (6)
dI =
∂I
∂Y
dY +
∂I
∂h
dh, (7)
dX =
∂X
∂Y
dY +
∂X
∂h
dh, (8)
and by substituting (6) - (8) into (5) and rearranging, we have the total derivative,
dY
dh
=
(
∂C
∂h
+
∂I
∂h
+
∂X
∂h
)(
1− ∂C
∂Y
− ∂I
∂Y
− ∂X
∂Y
)−1
. (9)
Equation (9) summarises the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis. One usually assumes
that the second term in brackets is positive, that consumption is increasing in the labour
share, and that both investment and net exports are non-increasing in the labour share. If
the positive effect of an increase in the labour share on consumption outweighs any negative
effects on investment and net exports, then the total effect on GDP will be positive.
There is a rather large literature testing the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, the
bulk of which estimates equations of the form (2) - (4) on an equation-by-equation basis.
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The studies that apply this method to UK data are Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and
Storm (2007), Hein and Vogel (2008), Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011), Onaran and Galanis
(2014), and Obst and Onaran (2015). All of these papers, apart from Stockhammer and
Stehrer (2011), find that aggregate demand in the UK is wage led. There is an issue, however,
in assuming that the labour share is exogenous. While this is a legitimate procedure in a
thought experiment of the sort described above, it is potentially problematic when testing
the theory. Particularly, issues of endogeneity bias may cast doubt on the results.
While the issue of endogeneity bias is often discussed in the empirical literature, it is not
often dealt with. The natural solution would be to estimate a VAR in the components of
aggregate demand and the labour share, but this runs into a severe sample size problem given
the number of parameters to be estimated. One solution is to estimate a VAR in GDP and
the labour share, assuming a reduced form specification, following the study of Barbosa-Filho
and Taylor (2006) for the USA. In this case one can derive impulse response functions which
roughly correspond to (9). Unfortunately, at this point, one faces an identification problem.
Specifically, meaningful impulse response functions require orthogonal shock processes, and
the notion of orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks is just as problematic as treating the
labour share itself as exogenous.
One notable solution to this conundrum is that of Stockhammer and Onaran (2004),
which estimates a structural VAR model based explicitly on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990).
This circumvents the problem of imagining orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks by an
appeal to a structural model with a large number of degrees of freedom. The authors find
that shocks to the functional distribution of income have essentially no effect on capacity
utilisation, and thus find no support for the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis. This is
an incongruous result made particularly worrying by the aforementioned estimation bias in
the group of studies that find that the UK is wage led.
The present paper aims to resolve this incongruity. As with Stockhammer and Onaran
(2004), we estimate VAR models for the UK. Unlike the latter, we take an indirect approach
by disaggregating the labour share into real earnings, total employment, and GDP. We are
then left with a model in GDP (Y ), total employment (L), and real earnings (w),
Y = Y (w,L), (10)
L = L(w, Y ), (11)
w = w(Y, L). (12)
Here, (10) is an aggregate demand curve, (11) is an employment curve, and (12) is an
earnings curve. While we expect the earnings curve to be increasing in both GDP and
employment, both ∂Y/∂w and ∂L/∂w are ambiguous. If the former is positive, then a
positive shock to the earnings curve increases aggregate demand. This case is illustrated in
the left panel of figure 1, which plots an upward sloping earnings curve and upward sloping
aggregate demand curve in (w, Y ) space.
Given the above, we take advantage of the fact that exogenous changes in the labour
share in the heterodox perspective are usually held to be driven by changes in workers’
bargaining power. This view is summarised in the following passage discussing policies
associated with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis:
4
Y Y
w w
WC
AD AD
WC
Figure 1: Illustrating the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis.
“Pro-labour policies . . . are often referred to as policies that strengthen the
welfare state, labour market institutions, labour unions, and the ability to engage
in collective bargaining (e.g., by extending the reach of bargaining agreements
to non-unionised firms). Pro-labour policies are also associated with increased
unemployment benefits, higher minimum wages and a higher minimum wage
relative to the median wage, as well as reductions in wage and salary dispersion”
(Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012).
In light of this, we will interpret identified real earnings shocks as bargaining power shocks.
We will then consider the data to be consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hy-
pothesis if positive real earnings shocks lead to increases in both GDP and the labour share.
This case is illustrated in the right panel of figure 1, under the assumption that the change
in total employment is non-negative and ∂w/∂Y = 0. Thus we take an indirect approach to
testing the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, avoiding issues of endogeneity bias and
the need to construct orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks.
This approach is dissimilar to the existing literature testing the wage led aggregate
demand hypothesis, and may be compared to the econometric literature studying the re-
lationship of real wages, output, and employment over the business cycle. This literature
goes back to Rueff, Dunlop, and Tarshis, and Brandolini (1995) provides a comprehensive
survey of the literature up to the early 1990s. A notable recent study is McFarlane et al
(2014), which studies the business cycle co-movements of Canadian wages, output, and em-
ployment, using the VAR methodology. In addition, we may usefully compare our approach
to the New Keynesian theories of real wages and aggregate demand, where exogenous move-
ments in the real wage can be driven by productivity shocks as well as bargaining power
shocks. An example is Balmaseda et al (2000), which finds that positive real wage shocks
increase aggregate demand, but these shocks are interpreted as productivity shocks rather
than bargaining power shocks.
While our approach is formally similar to the econometric literature surveyed in Bran-
dolini (1995) and the New Keynesian literature, it must be stressed that our goal is very
different. Unlike these literatures, we are not primarily concerned with the relationship be-
tween output and the real wage (or real earnings). Instead, we are primarily concerned with
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the relationship between output and the labour share, and will only consider the data to be
consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis if positive real earnings shocks
lead to increases in both GDP and the labour share. This is not often a concern of the
aforementioned literatures, for which the functional distribution of income is not considered
important on the demand side, although there is an issue of observational equivalence to
bear in mind1. This is discussed with the data in section 4, after our identification strategy
is discussed in section 3.
3 Empirical Approach
As discussed in section 2, we model movements in real earnings rather than the labour share,
and follow Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) by estimating the following,
Azt = α +
p∑
i=1
Aizt−i + ut, (13)
zt = µ+
p∑
i=1
Cizt−i + t, (14)
where (13) is the structural model, and (14) is the reduced form. The vector zt contains GDP,
total employment, and real earnings, ut is a white noise vector process with ut ∼ N(0, I), and
t is a white noise vector process with t ∼ N(0,Σ). This leads to an identification problem:
recovering A from the estimated reduced form (14). Our identification strategy follows the
short run restriction approach described in Sims (1986) by specifying zero elasticities within
the period. From (13) and (14) we have t = A
−1ut, or At = ut. Expanding, we have:

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33


Y
L
w
 =

uY
uL
uw
 . (15)
As we are primarily concerned with the effects of real earnings shocks, we do not fully
identify the model. Instead, we rely on two restrictions to A to achieve partial identification.
Specifically, we assume a31 = a32 = 0. It is well established that nominal wage and price
contracts are updated infrequently and set in advance of production (see e.g. Druant et
al (2012) and the references therein). In addition, the relevant output and employment
data are released with a lag, and are subject to substantial uncertainty concerning future
revision. Finally, wage setting is known to depend on a number of largely non-economic
considerations, including notions of fairness that evolve very slowly (Bewley 1999). Given
1Positive wage shocks in New Keynesian models usually reduce output on impact. Interestingly, however,
a weak wage led aggregate demand mechanism is incorporated into the Bank of England’s COMPASS model,
where a wage mark-up shock “temporarily increases labour income and consumption of [liquidity] constrained
households, which is sufficient to increase total consumption in the near term. This effect means that GDP
does not fall immediately” (Burgess et al 2013a, 2013b: B17). Also see Charpe and Ku¨hn (2015).
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this, and postponing a discussion of the components of earnings until section 4, it seems
reasonable to assume that real earnings do not react to aggregate demand or labour demand
movements within the period, which supplies us with the two identification restrictions,
a31 = a32 = 0. Thus (15) reduces to,

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
0 0 a33


Y
L
w
 =

uY
uL
uw
 . (16)
The restrictions embodied in (16) imply that real earnings are the “most exogenous”
variable in our system, which is broadly in line with the Post Keynesian approach to wage
led aggregate demand discussed above. Given this, (16) is not fully identified, but the real
earnings shock uw is identified, and the impulse response functions and variance decompo-
sitions for uw can be computed without further identification restrictions. In particular, the
impulse response functions and variance decompositions for uw in (16) are equivalent to any
Cholesky decomposition in which real earnings are ordered first (as A is block recursive; see
e.g. Christiano et al (1999) or Garratt et al (2012)).
4 Data
4.1 Sources
As explained in sections 2 and 3, we estimate VARs in GDP, total employment, and real
earnings. The raw data are as follows: non-seasonally adjusted (NSA) quarterly nominal
GDP from the UK quarterly national accounts (code BKTL), seasonally adjusted (SA)
nominal GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code YBHA), NSA UK real (chain
value) GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code BKVT), SA UK real (chain value)
GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code ABMI), SA total employment from the
Labour Force Survey, NSA average weekly earnings from the ONS Employment and Earnings
publications (codes MD9M and KA46), and the NSA retail price index from the ONS
MM23 Consumer Price Indices publication (code CDKO). Only the GDP series are available
both SA and NSA; the historical earnings and price data are only available NSA, and the
employment data are only available SA (as the quarterly data are interpolated on an SA
basis prior to 1992).
Given the above, we construct two NSA real earnings series using average earnings
deflated by the retail price index and average earnings deflated by the NSA GDP deflator,
where the latter is given by the ratio of NSA nominal and NSA real GDP. We then seasonally
adjust these NSA real earnings series using the automated Census X-13 procedure in EViews,
which yields two SA real earnings series. We can then estimate four VARs in total: two
VARs using NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first
uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs
using SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI
deflated earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings). Thus we use SA and NSA
data, and two different earnings deflators, to increase the robustness of our results. All of the
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Figure 2: NSA Real GDP, SA total employment, and NSA real earnings series, four
quarter log differences, 1972 - 2007.
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series run from 1971 to 2014, although on inspection there appears to be a large structural
break in the real earnings series around 2008, which causes fairly serious problems for our
estimates. Given this, we limit our sample size to end at 2007Q4.
4.2 Unit Roots Tests
With respect to the SA data, three different unit root tests were employed to determine the
order of integration of the series: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; Said and Dickey
1984); the Dickey–Fuller Generalized Least Squares test (DF-GLS; Elliot et al. 1996);
and the Modified Phillips-Perron test (M-PP; Ng and Perron 2001). We employed OLS-
detrended data as the autoregressive spectral estimation method in the M-PP test since,
according to Perron and Qu (2007), this method can be considered as a solution to the draw-
back that (for non-local alternatives) the power of the M-PP tests can be very small. The
highest lag order (lmax) selected to carry out the three tests was determined from the sample
size according to the method proposed by Schwert (1989): lmax =
[
12 (144/100)0.25
] ≈ 13.
We employed different methods to determine the optimal lag order in each test: the Schwarz
information criterion was employed for the ADF test, the general-to-specific procedure (Ng
and Perron 1995) was employed for the DF-GLS test, and the Modified Akaike Information
Criterion (Ng and Perron 2001) was employed for the M-PP test.
Table A1 in the appendix reports the different linear unit root tests that best capture
the actual behaviour of the series in order to avoid misspecification. All tests were carried
out including a constant and a trend as exogenous regressors for the different series. The
tests shows that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level
of significance in the majority of the log-levels of the series, and that the null hypothesis
is rejected when the first differences of the log-levels of the series are considered. Hence,
it is possible to conclude that the growth rates of the series can be characterised as I(0)
processes.
With respect to the NSA data, we employed the HEGY test for seasonal unit roots
(Hylleberg et al 1990), using the HEGY test add-in for EViews. This tests for unit roots
at seasonal frequencies, indicating how the data should be differenced (in order to prevent
over-differencing and the incorporation of artificial moving average components). The test
results are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. All tests were carried out including a
constant, a trend, and seasonal dummies as exogenous regressors for the different series. The
different tests show that none of the log-levels of the series can be considered as stationary
series since the null hypotheses that pi1 = 0, pi2 = 0 and pi3 = pi4 = 0 are not rejected (see
Hylleberg et al 1990)2. Likewise, it is possible to observe that the four-quarter differences of
the log-levels of series can be considered as stationary series since the null hypotheses that
pi1 = 0, pi2 = 0 and pi3 = pi4 = 0 are not rejected.
As discussed above, we estimate four VARs in total: two VARs using NSA real GDP,
NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings,
and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs using SA real GDP, SA real
earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the
second uses GDP deflated earnings). Given the results of the unit roots tests, all variables
2There appears to be no non-seasonal unit root in the log-level of the GDP deflated earnings since the
null hypothesis that pi1 = 0 is rejected in this case. The slight ambiguities in the unit root tests should not
create too much doubt in the inference, however, as all series are expected to be intrinsically non-stationary.
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Figure 4: NSA real earnings and SA hours per person, four quarter log differences, 1972 -
2007.
in the first two VARs are in four quarter log differences, and all variables in the second two
VARs are in one quarter log differences.
4.3 Description
Figure 2 plots the four quarter log differences of NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA
total employment, from 1972 - 2007. While real earnings appear to be mildly pro-cyclical
and less volatile than GDP, total employment follows GDP with a considerable lag and is
much less volatile than GDP, even allowing for the interpolated data prior to 1992. The real
earnings series appear to differ slightly depending on the deflator used, with the differences
being most pronounced in the late 1970s and late 1990s. Figure 3 plots four quarter log
differences of NSA real GDP and the NSA labour share, where the latter is approximated
by the four quarter log difference of NSA real earnings plus the four quarter log difference
of SA total employment minus the four quarter log difference of NSA real GDP. This figure
illustrates the well known counter-cyclicality of the labour share, in contrast with the mild
pro-cyclicality of real earnings illustrated in figure 2.
Two final points must be noted. First, the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, as
we interpret it, requires a positive real earnings shock to increase both GDP and the labour
share, which might appear inconsistent with the counter-cyclicality of the labour share at
first glance. However, all this implies is that shocks to real earnings that increase both
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the labour share and GDP cannot be a significant source of fluctuations in either variable,
and the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is thus perfectly consistent with a counter-
cyclical labour share. This conjecture, in fact, is supported by the variance decomposition
analyses presented in section 5. Second, average earnings are given by the average hourly
wage multiplied by average hours worked per person, and thus it is possible that the mild
pro-cyclicality of real earnings is driven in the main by pro-cyclical hours worked. Moreover,
a positive shock to real earnings could be interpreted as a positive shock to hours worked
per person, which does not support an interpretation of earnings shocks as bargaining power
shocks. However, we have good reason to believe that the bulk of fluctuations in average
weekly earnings are accounted for by fluctuations in the hourly wage. Figure 4 plots the
four quarter log difference of NSA average weekly earnings deflated by the RPI deflator and
the four quarter log difference of an estimate of SA weekly hours worked per person (total
weekly hours, LFS code YBUS, divided by total employment as above). The hours series
is considerably less volatile than the real earnings series over the majority of the sample,
and the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between the two series is negative and not
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Thus we expect the bulk of fluctuations in
real earnings to be due to real wage fluctuations, and we do not expect positive shocks to
real earnings to be the result of increases in hours worked3.
5 Results
5.1 Reduced Form Estimates
As discussed in sections 2, 3 and 4, we estimate VAR models in GDP, total employment,
and real earnings. We estimate four reduced form VARs in total: two VARs using NSA
real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated
earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs using SA real GDP,
SA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and
the second uses GDP deflated earnings). All series in the first two VARs are in four quarter
log differences, and all series in the second two VARs are in one quarter log differences,
following the unit root tests described in section 4.
First, we estimate the two reduced form VARs with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings,
and SA total employment, where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses
GDP deflated earnings. The AIC lag length criteria for both the RPI deflator model and
the GDP deflator model indicate 10 lags, and 10 lags also results in reasonable statistics for
residual autocorrelation. Both models with 10 lags are stable, with all roots lying within
the unit circle. In addition, we cannot reject the null of homoskedasticity using the White
test for either model. Although the simple reduced form models appear to be well specified
in terms of residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, residual normality test results
are unsatisfactory. Bearing this in mind, we choose 10 lags for both reduced form VARs.
Detailed tables of results for the specification tests can be found in table B1 in the appendix.
Second, we estimate the two reduced form VARs with SA real GDP, SA real earnings,
and SA total employment, where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses
3Our results are robust to replacing the weekly earnings series with an estimated hourly earnings series
constructed using the ONS hours data, although this reduces our ability to infer labour share movements
from the results.
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GDP deflated earnings. The AIC lag length criteria for both the RPI deflator model and
the GDP deflator model indicate 3 lags, but both models with 3 lags appear to suffer from
residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. However, reasonable statistics for residual
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are achieved in models with 10 lags as before (al-
though the RPI deflator model suffers from heteroskedasticity problems even with 10 lags).
Both models with 10 lags are stable, with all roots lying within the unit circle. Finally, both
models again suffer from residual normality problems4. Bearing this in mind, we choose 10
lags for both reduced form VARs. Detailed tables of results for the specification tests can
be found in table B2 in the appendix.
5.2 Impulse Response Functions
As discussed in section 3, we rely on a partial identification strategy that isolates shocks to
real earnings without making strong assumptions about the remaining direct and indirect
interactions. Figure 5 plots the impulse response functions and 95% confidence bands, for
all three variables, in response to a positive shock to the earnings curve based on this
partial identification, for the models with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total
employment. Precisely, we use a Cholesky decomposition with ordering: real earnings, real
GDP, total employment, which as discussed in section 3 is equivalent to the ordering: real
earnings, total employment, real GDP. Figure 5 plots the responses for the model with
RPI deflated earnings in the left three panels, and responses for the model with GDP
deflated earnings in the right three panels. It is immediately apparent that a positive real
earnings shock causes an increase in GDP on impact, and has no significant effect on total
employment. The differences between the two sets of impulse response functions are minor,
with the obvious difference being the larger effect of the real earnings shock on GDP in the
model with GDP deflated earnings. Aside from this, both sets of impulse response functions
imply that the positive effect on GDP growth of a real earnings shock declines to zero after
a year, and that the effect on total employment is negligible.
Figure 6 plots the impulse response functions and 95% confidence bands, for all three
variables, in response to a positive shock to the earnings curve based on this partial iden-
tification, for the models with SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment.
Figure 6 plots the responses for the model with RPI deflated earnings in the left three panels,
and responses for the model with GDP deflated earnings in the right three panels. As in the
models with NSA data, a positive real earnings shock causes an increase in GDP on impact,
and has no significant effect on total employment. The differences between the two sets of
impulse response functions are minor, and the effects of a real earnings shock on GDP at
impact are similar to those in the models with NSA data. The largest difference between
the impulse response functions in the models with SA data and the models with NSA data
is the length of the effect: a positive real earnings shock appears to have a positive effect on
GDP that only lasts a single quarter in the models using SA data5.
The conclusion that positive shocks to real earnings increase aggregate demand does not,
by itself, lead to the conclusion that the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is supported.
As noted in section 2, we also require that the labour share increases in response to an
4We added dummy variables in previous specifications to deal with this problem, which was more suc-
cessful in the models with NSA data than with SA data. The results were not materially affected, however,
so the final specifications do not include dummy variables.
5All confidence bands are computed using the bootstrap procedure in EViews with 1000 repetitions.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions of GDP (top), employment (middle), earnings
(bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings,
and SA total employment (four quarter log differences). Left panel: RPI deflated earnings,
right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions of GDP (top), employment (middle), earnings
(bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with SA real GDP, SA real earnings,
and SA total employment (one quarter log differences). Left panel: RPI deflated earnings,
right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
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Figure 7: Accumulated impulse response functions of GDP (top), employment (middle),
earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with NSA real GDP, NSA real
earnings, and SA total employment (four quarter log differences). Left panel: RPI deflated
earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
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Figure 8: Accumulated impulse response functions of GDP (top), employment (middle),
earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with SA real GDP, SA real
earnings, and SA total employment (one quarter log differences). Left panel: RPI deflated
earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
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Table 1: Forecast error variance decompositionsa
Forecast Horizon GDP Employment Earnings
VAR using RPI deflated earningsb
1 18.15 1.09 100.00
2 16.90 0.94 99.37
4 15.89 3.47 98.42
8 14.13 10.76 84.21
100 16.39 14.48 72.61
VAR using GDP deflated earningsb
1 31.49 3.74 100.00
2 28.72 4.39 97.84
4 21.53 6.85 97.34
8 18.92 11.50 92.51
100 17.41 13.22 84.28
Notes: aWe show the results of GDP, employment, and
real earnings to shocks in real earnings for the VAR
using NSA data; bPercentage points are shown.
exogenous increase in real earnings. As total employment does not respond significantly
to real earnings shocks in figures 5 and 6, and the response of real earnings is uniformly
greater than the response of aggregate demand, then we can say with confidence that both
aggregate demand and the labour share increase in response to a real earnings shock in the
United Kingdom. At the mean, from figures 5 and 6, our results indicate that a 1% shock
to real earnings should increase the labour share by approximately 0.5% to 0.7%, and GDP
by approximately 0.3% to 0.5%. At the lower end of our 95% confidence bands, our results
indicate that a 1% shock to real earnings should increase the labour share by approximately
0.75% to 0.8%, and GDP by approximately 0.2% to 0.25%. Given this, we conclude that the
data are consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis. However, the positive
effect of a real earnings shock on GDP appears to be short lived. Figures 7 and 8 plots the
cumulated counterparts to the impulse response functions presented in figures 5 and 6. One
can observe that the permanent effects of a real earnings shock on GDP and employment
are positive but relatively small, and at the 5% level are not significantly different from zero.
Thus our results indicate that wage led aggregate demand effects operate at relatively high
frequencies.
Finally, it was noted in section 4 that the labour share is counter-cyclical, despite the
result that identified shocks to real earnings increase both GDP and the labour share. This
implies that shocks to real earnings cannot account for a significant proportion of GDP
movements, which is confirmed by the forecast error variance decompositions in table 1 for
the VAR models with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (the
decompositions for the models with SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment
are similar). From this table we can see that higher proportions of the variation in GDP
can be explained by real earnings shocks when using the GDP deflator, and that shocks to
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real earnings explain at most 31.49% of the variation in GDP, corresponding to the first
lag of the forecast horizon when the VAR is estimated using GDP deflated earnings. In
the long run, real earnings shocks explain less than 20% of the variation in GDP and total
employment. These results support our previous conjecture that shocks to real earnings
explain a relatively small proportion of the variance in GDP. Therefore, while positive real
earnings shocks result in an increase in both GDP and the labour share, these shocks do
not account for a large proportion of GDP movements, such that the observed labour share
in the UK is countercyclical.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper starts with the observation that the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis
has been tested in the UK using a variety of estimation procedures. Studies relying on
equation-by-equation estimation procedures tend to find support for wage led aggregate
demand in the UK, while the single study using systems estimation finds no support for
the hypothesis. In order to resolve this incongruity, we test the wage led aggregate demand
hypothesis using VAR models estimated on quarterly data. We use a variety of data types,
and take a relatively liberal approach to identification. Particularly, we use a simple partial
identification strategy based on shocks to real earnings rather than the labour share. Our
conclusions are unambiguous: all of our models indicate that positive shocks to real earnings
increase both GDP and the labour share, indicating that aggregate demand in the UK is
wage led. Thus our investigation provides support for the wage led aggregate demand
hypothesis in the UK during the period of study.
We believe the implications for heterodox theory are the following. First, a Goodwinian
(profit-led) interpretation of the Bhaduri-Marglin model is not supported, and nor is the
production side of the standard Goodwin model. However, it is reasonable to conjecture
that Goodwin effects might operate over the medium to long run, following Atkinson (1969),
as we only find evidence for expansionary real earnings shocks in the short run. From the
perspective of policy, it would seem possible in principle for the government to use an
incomes policy for the purpose of demand management, as opposed to price control as was
the case in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it should be noted that the expansionary effects
of higher earnings seem to be quite limited and relatively short-lived by our estimates, and
that there is very little impact on total employment.
One possible avenue for future research is to take a more expansive approach to the
effects of wage shocks on the major macroeconomic variables. This will require a treatment
of nominal wage and price inflation, which we do not provide in the present paper. A second
is to explore the link between employment and the labour share in more detail, which might
be amenable to direct estimation. A third possibility is to exploit the existence of long time
series data at annual frequency for countries such as the UK. Finally, one could estimate
non-linear models to investigate the effects of earnings or wage shocks at different stages of
the business cycle. One hopes, with the ongoing work in this area, that a consensus will be
reached on the broad effects of income distribution on aggregate demand in the near future.
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A Unit root tests
Table A1: Linear unit root tests on seasonally adjusted data
ADFa,b DF-GLSa,b M-PPa,b
Log-levels
GDP -3.36* -2.84* -19.84**
Employment -1.91 -2.36 -8.19
Earnings (RPI deflator) -1.62 -1.89 -7.05
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.77** -2.54 -9.84
First differences of the log-levels
GDP -5.46** -3.87** -25.36***
Employment -3.08 -3.19** -18.25**
Earnings (RPI deflator) -4.11*** -5.58*** -48.70**
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.73** -11.89*** -68.75***
Notes: aStatistics reported: ADF and DF-GLS=t-statistic; M-
PP=MZa-statistic; bCritical values used: ADF=MacKinnon (1996)
one-sided p-values; DF-GLS=Table 1 of Elliot et al. (1996); M-
PP=Table 1 of Ng and Perron (2001). *, **, and *** respectively
denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
confidence levels.
Table A2: HEGY tests on non-seasonally adjusted data
pi1 = 0
a pi2 = 0
a pi3 = pi4 = 0
a
Log-levels
GDP -2.54 -0.94 3.07
Earnings (RPI deflator) 1.57 0.01 0.02
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.61** -0.62 1.70
Four-quarter differences of the log-levels
GDP -4.08*** -6.21*** 49.34***
Employment -3.31* -4.26*** 33.14***
Earnings (RPI deflator) -4.49*** -3.86*** 32.86***
Earnings (GDP deflator) -4.76*** -3.84*** 25.29***
Notes: aP-values were obtained from Monte Carlo simulations
(2000 replications). Lag length selected according to the Akaike
information criterion. *, **, and *** respectively denote rejection
of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels.
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B Joint misspecification tests
Table B1: Misspecification tests over VAR models with NSA dataa
Autocorrelationb Heteroskedasticity Normality
Statistic p-value χ2 statistic p-value Statistic p-value
VAR using RPI deflated earnings
16.79 0.052 396.93 0.09 95.31 0
VAR using GDP deflated earnings
12.74 0.17 289.34 0.99 42.00 0
Notes: aTests employed: Serial correlation=Lagrange Mul-
tiplier; Heteroskedasticity=White (no cross terms); Normal-
ity=Cholesky of covariance (Lutkepohl); bWe only report the
results that test for first-order serial correlation.
Table B2: Misspecification tests over VAR models with SA dataa
Autocorrelationb Heteroskedasticity Normality
Statistic p-value χ2 statistic p-value Statistic p-value
VAR using RPI deflated earnings
7.45 0.59 426.42 0.009 30.79 0
VAR using GDP deflated earnings
8.32 0.50 367.81 0.38 31.63 0
Notes: aTests employed: Serial correlation=Lagrange Mul-
tiplier; Heteroskedasticity=White (no cross terms); Normal-
ity=Cholesky of covariance (Lutkepohl); bWe only report the
results that test for first-order serial correlation.
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